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ABSTRACT
We propose a methodology to analyze the risk 
of an adversary exploiting the maritime supply 
chain by smuggling a WMD in a container. 
We call this risk “WMD transfer risk”. We 
describe an extension of an existing modeling/
simulation tool wherein we show how to 
quantify the deterrence effects of optimal 
investments in WMD detection technology at 
U.S. ports; and measure subsequent reduction 
in WMD transfer risk. 
From a theoretical perspective, the implications 
of notional results from this model are 
different from implications of the results of 
traditional “game theoretical” models. From a 
practitioner perspective, our results emphasize 
the importance of tailoring foreign intelligence 
gathering efforts, hardening foreign ports 
against exploitation in addition to hardening 
U.S. ports, and comparing simulated optimal 
technology costs to real-world R&D and 
implementation costs. The audience for our 
proposal includes WMD detection technology 
engineers, law enforcement and security 
personnel, port operators, and agency 
executives.
INTRODUCTION
The security of the international maritime 
supply chain is vital to the economic well-being 
of the United States.  The National Strategy 
for Global Supply Chain Security,1 Maritime 
Commerce Security Plan,2 and other national 
strategies emphasize the importance of supply 
chain integrity to economic prosperity. Thus, 
we want to protect the supply chain from overt 
disruptions such as direct attacks on ports.
However, supply chain security is also 
important for a different reason: to prevent 
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its exploitation by way of smuggling illicit 
materials and people into the United States. 
Other strategies such as the National Strategy 
to Combat Transnational Organized Crime,3 
and reports such as Maritime Transport and 
Destabilizing Commodity Flows,4 emphasize 
the attractiveness of supply chain exploitation 
to criminal and terrorist elements. This 
includes possible “transfer” of a weapon of mass 
destruction (WMD) into the United States, with 
the intent to detonate it in an inland city. While 
this is not the same problem as a direct supply 
chain disruption, the consequences of an inland 
WMD detonation are extremely important to 
address. 
To address this issue, technology analysis, 
and modeling and simulation coupled with 
risk analysis, can help us determine where 
supply chains are susceptible to exploitation 
by WMD transfer. This can help us think about 
where to place limited resources to mitigate 
this susceptibility. The Maritime Commerce 
Security Plan advocates:
Maritime security now involves risks that 
must be met with a layered approach that 
identifies and interdicts the threat as far as 
possible from the U.S. borders. A potential 
worst case scenario is the risk that a weapon of 
mass destruction is concealed in a container. 
Such a threat has severe consequences and 
must be detected as early as possible. A 
successful strategy will use risk management 
to align capabilities with threats to achieve the 
optimal response and protect the nation.5 
It can be debated whether a shipping 
container is the most likely mechanism for 
smuggling a WMD into the U.S. Nonetheless, 
analyzing the risk of WMD smuggled in shipping 
containers is one possible approach to reducing 
WMD transfer risk, since shipping containers 
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carry much of the goods shipped internationally 
via maritime conveyance. Before we propose 
an approach to do this, we review existing and 
emerging WMD detection technology, risk 
analysis, and modeling/simulation initiatives.
Existing and Emerging 
Technological Solutions
The Domestic Nuclear Detection Office 
(DNDO), a Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS) component agency, has for the last 
several years managed the implementation 
of the Global Nuclear Detection Architecture 
(GNDA). The GNDA is a multilayered 
framework of radiological and nuclear weapon 
detection technologies and coordinating 
mechanisms, both within the United States and 
overseas.6 Example initiatives include:
• The Department of Energy (DOE) 
Megaports initiative leverages technology 
to identify and screen high risk cargo 
shipments overseas, before they depart 
enroute U.S. ports.7
• Customs and Border Protection (CBP’s) 
Radiation Portal Monitors (RPMs) leverage 
technology to detect the presence of 
radioactive material in cargo shipments, 
primarily in U.S. ports.8
• U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) officers, equipped 
with radiation detection equipment, board 
vessels to ensure security and verify 
compliance with various regulations.9 
One emerging technology is the Advanced 
Spectroscopic Portal monitor (ASP) initiative. 
This initiative was intended to replace the 
existing RPMs, which only detect a radiological 
or nuclear signature. Then, secondary screening 
must be performed to identify the source of the 
signature. In contrast, the ASPs were intended 
to provide both a primary and a secondary 
screening function.10 However, this technology 
has had some challenges to implementation, 
as detailed in a National Academies report.11 
Going forward, the lessons learned from 
ASP development may benefit any efforts to 
develop the next generation of WMD detection 
technology.
There are many other initiatives not listed 
here. Together, these initiatives help reduce 
WMD transfer risk. Located both overseas 
and in the U.S., they constitute a layered 
defense. But, currently most of the focus 
is on the evaluation and testing of existing 
and emerging technologies. In addition 
to modeling technology effectiveness, we 
might also model how technology influences 
supply chain exploitation risk. Modeling and 
simulating supply chain exploitation risk 
requires quantitative representation of the 
layered defenses in the supply chain, and 
how technology effectiveness measurably 
contributes to those defenses. Furthermore, 
Taquechel and Lewis make the case for 
quantifying deterrence effectiveness of risk 
mitigation solutions,12 and applying that metric 
to determine unconditional risk.13 There is 
also work on optimal solutions to network risk 
problems, which could support a WMD layered 
defense strategy within budget constraints.14 
These concepts could be applied to a holistic 
framework for analyzing WMD transfer risk 
reduction, and could contribute to efforts to 
develop new WMD detection technology. 
Existing and Emerging 
Risk Analysis and Network 
Modeling
Existing risk models such as the Coast Guard’s 
Combating Maritime Terrorism Strategic Risk 
Model analyze risk of a WMD attack on U.S. 
port cities and grossly estimate risk reduction 
effectiveness of current USCG activities.15 
However, it is unclear whether this model 
explicitly measures deterrence effectiveness of 
these activities, or allows an analyst to simulate 
optimal activity levels or resource allocations 
to minimize WMD risk. It is also unclear 
whether this model incorporates estimates 
of WMD detection technology effectiveness 
into its algorithms, and whether it accounts 
for overseas exploitation. Also, the U.S. Coast 
Guard’s Maritime Security Risk Analysis Model 
(MSRAM) is a risk analysis tool that might be 
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enhanced to analyze WMD risk, but it does not 
model network effects,16 so it is unclear whether 
MSRAM in its current state could support a 
layered defense strategy for reducing WMD 
risk. 
With respect to analyzing detection 
effectiveness in the context of supply chain 
network risk analysis, an attacker may exploit 
different supply chain network “nodes” such 
as foreign ports and U.S. ports to smuggle a 
WMD. Network science offers techniques to 
model the relationships between these nodes. 
Lewis explains network science and leverages 
its techniques in a modeling and simulation 
tool called the Model Based Risk Assessment 
(MBRA) model, in order to analyze network 
risk.17 MBRA can perform optimization or 
minimization of network risk given a limited 
budget, and can calculate return on investment. 
It treats risk as a probabilistic function of 
simulated investments. Other network analysis 
efforts to examine supply chain exploitation 
include a University of Southern California’s 
Center for Risk and Economic Analysis of 
Terrorism Events (CREATE) initiative to 
develop a systems-based framework to analyze 
WMD transfer risk.18 Also, DNDO is expanding 
its Radiological and Nuclear Terrorism Risk 
Analysis (RNTRA) model to explicitly model 
pathway exploitation.19 
These efforts are laudable. That said, there 
is an acknowledged need for an “integrated, 
holistic approach to the…security of maritime 
activities.”20 In this spirit, Taquechel extended 
Lewis’ MBRA model to show a “transfer threat 
network” model, including foreign ports where 
a shipping container would originate.21 This 
work also showed how attacker preferences 
can be used in place of traditional network 
science metrics. However, Taquechel’s MBRA 
extension does not simulate how WMD 
detection technology effectiveness influences 
network risk minimization, nor does it show 
how to measure potential deterrence effects of 
WMD technology investments. We now explain 
how our proposed modeling approach will 
complement and build upon these existing and 
emerging efforts.
Our First Contribution: 
Integrating Detection 
Effectiveness and Network 
Modeling
Our defense against WMD transfer might 
benefit from a comprehensive approach to 
(1) quantitatively model the risk reduction 
effectiveness of existing WMD detection 
technology investments at different layers of 
the supply chain, and (2) do this in the context 
of overall supply chain exploitation risk. Our 
existing efforts might also benefit from the 
analysis of optimal places in the supply chain 
for additional investment, where we could 
leverage emerging technology. Thus, one way to 
enhance existing efforts is to develop a modeling 
and simulation approach that captures WMD 
detection technology effectiveness estimates, 
and that performs supply chain network 
analysis, risk analysis, basic optimization 
techniques, and return on investment analysis 
to produce a comprehensive WMD transfer risk 
evaluation framework. We propose an approach 
to do precisely this, by expanding Taquechel’s 
original transfer threat model. 
Our Second Contribution: 
Quantifying Deterrence 
Effects of WMD Transfer 
Risk Mitigation Investments
This expansion will also leverage the 
quantification of deterrence, as introduced 
in Taquechel and Lewis. Cronin and Cronin 
propose that deterrence occurs when an actor 
discourages aggression toward another actor, 
with the intended outcome that the former 
never has to respond to aggressive action by 
the latter.22 Thus, we might attempt to deter 
an attacker from smuggling a WMD through 
the supply chain, rather than relying solely 
upon our detection equipment once a WMD 
has already entered the network. However, in 
this paper we focus instead on modeling how 
deterrence influences various attacker options, 
which we will call relative deterrence. That said, 
we want to quantify the relative deterrence 
effects of our technology investments, and 
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estimate how deterrence measurably reduces 
WMD transfer risk. The National Academies 
report on challenges with ASP implementation 
specifically identified that:
Deterrence…is an important factor in the 
likelihood that a malefactor will decide to try 
to smuggle a weapon or weapon materials, but 
there is not yet a widely accepted intellectual 
framework…to measure or evaluate this 
factor.23
Taquechel and Lewis show how risk can 
change based on changes in attacker intent. We 
can quantify the change in that intent based 
on the difference between (1) attacker intent 
to execute a specific attack before deterrence 
investments, and (2) attacker intent to execute 
that same attack after deterrence investments. 
That change in intent represents deterrence, 
and intent is a component of the legacy DHS 
risk equation Risk=f(Threat, Vulnerability, 
Consequence), where Threat is comprised of 
attacker Intent and Capability.24 The general 
deterrence quantification equation we will use 














Equation 1. Deterrence effectiveness
Taquechel and Lewis originally presented 
this concept in the context of deterring 
attacks on individual infrastructures, without 
explicitly accounting for network effects. Thus, 
we now extend deterrence quantification to 
the problem of reducing WMD transfer risk, 
a network analysis problem. The Maritime 
Commerce Security Plan advocates deterring 
attacks by inspecting cargo early in the supply 
chain, before it arrives in U.S. ports.25 This 
plan also claims inspecting cargo in a U.S. 
port is too late to deter an attack on that port; 
however, if the WMD target is an inland port, 
as it is in our approach, then investing in 
detection capabilities in U.S. ports could have 
deterrence value. We thus want to measure 
that value to use in quantitative WMD transfer 
risk analysis. Furthermore, RAND emphasizes 
the importance of deterrence in implementing 
technology for security improvements, as it 
would contribute to threat and vulnerability 
reduction, but they do not further address 
deterrence in their report.26
Given this context, there are various 
ongoing deterrence analysis initiatives in DHS, 
including a CREATE effort27 and a DHS Science 
and Technology directorate (S&T) review of 
multiple methodological approaches to model 
intelligent adversaries and deterrence.28 Also, 
DNDO’s RNTRA efforts emphasize deterrence 
of WMD attacks.29 These efforts are well-
intentioned and useful, but it is not clear 
whether they explicitly measure deterrence 
or explicitly examine the effects of deterrence 
upon WMD transfer risk. 
In an analysis of the ASP program, the 
Congressional Research Service (CRS) 
recommended that DNDO consider game-
theoretical analyses to determine whether the 
ASP technology might offer any deterrence 
effects.30 Our proposed model will quantify the 
WMD transfer risk reduction effects of detection 
technology, which could be existing technology 
such as the RPMs. But, our model will also 
quantify the prospective deterrence effects of 
emerging technology implementation, such as 
new solutions that might emerge as follow-on 
to the ASP initiative. We will use a modified 
game theoretical approach, from Taquechel and 
Lewis, to quantify these prospective deterrence 
effects in our model.31
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Putting It All Together: Our 
Proposed Methodological 
Approach
In sum, we will enhance Lewis’ MBRA model, 
specifically a logic tree model extension thereof, 
to model a supply chain as a network of nodes 
and links between the nodes, and we will include 
foreign ports, U.S. ports, and U.S. inland cities 
as nodes. The links will represent attacker 
transfer pathway options. We will also include 
a technique to incorporate WMD detection 
technology effectiveness estimates into our 
extension’s WMD transfer risk calculations. 
These estimates will reflect effectiveness of 
equipment that detects WMD hidden within 
shipping containers while in port, resulting in 
estimated exploitation susceptibility of each 
network node. Exploitation susceptibility 
will be modeled as an explicit function of the 
detection equipment investments at each 
node. We will calculate optimal investments in 
emerging detection technology at U.S. ports to 
minimize network risk, and we will quantify the 
deterrence effects of those optimal investments. 
Finally, our model will show how deterrence 
investments mitigate WMD transfer risk, and 
will show return on investment. 
This will create a holistic approach to 
assessing and reducing WMD transfer risk. 
Each of the previously discussed modeling 
efforts and technologies provides a critical 
piece of the puzzle, but we believe our approach 
integrates concepts from these efforts into a 
comprehensive systems analysis approach. 
Our approach may be valuable for those who 
need to analyze supply chain susceptibility to 
WMD smuggling, those who are developing 
solutions, and those who decide where/how 
to implement solutions:  the U.S. intelligence 
community, the U.S. Coast Guard, Customs 
and Border Protection, DNDO, and other 
entities with maritime security and WMD 
detection responsibilities. Our approach 
may also be useful for agencies who evaluate 
the effectiveness of emerging technologies, 
such as DNDO. Furthermore, our approach 
may be useful for agency officials who report 
performance measures to oversight bodies.
We include the deterrence quantification 
effects in our WMD transfer risk analysis 
methodology based on the belief that 
incorporating deterrence effectiveness into risk 
calculations more accurately represents risk. 
The Coast Guard currently reports the general 
transfer risk reduction effectiveness of Coast 
Guard activities as measured in its Combating 
Maritime Terrorism Strategic Risk Model,32 
but our approach could provide additional 
methodological rigor.
Our Proposed Methodology: 
Summary of Steps
We will leverage the following methodological 
steps in our extension of Lewis’ MBRA model:
1. We re-introduce a general transfer network 
model from Taquechel [2010].33  This 
model will be that of a supply chain with 
three “layers” of nodes: foreign ports (FP), 
domestic U.S. ports of entry (DP), and U.S. 
inland cities (T, the targets of WMD attack), 
thus it models a “WMD transfer network.” 
We then explain possible transfer pathways 
to the target nodes that an attacker could 
exploit by smuggling a WMD within a 
container. A pathway reflects the attacker’s 
choice of exploiting specific ports in each 
supply chain layer. Each pathway poses a 
specific WMD transfer risk to U.S. inland 
cities. 
2. We explain probabilistic risk characteristics 
of each port node in our model. These 
probabilities reflect, for example, the 
notional detection effectiveness of WMD 
detection technology in each domestic port 
of entry. 
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3. We aggregate the node risk characteristics 
from step 2 to develop conditional transfer 
risk equations for different notional network 
configurations. See Figure 1 which shows an 
OR-OR configuration. These configurations 
reflect the different possible permutations 
of logic gates in our example, showing the 
relationships between nodes, but presented 
as a framework for attacker transfer pathway 
options. Even though the configurations 
do not specify individual pathways, their 
equations are necessary because later we 
will optimize deterrence investment with 
respect to the configurations, not with 
respect to individual pathways. This will be 
a way of “hedging” against possible pathway 
exploitation.34  In network science terms 
the relationships between nodes are known 
as “topology”.35  
4. We turn those conditional transfer risk 
equations into attacker expected utility 
function equations for our transfer 
pathways from step 1.  A utility function 
represents the value to the attacker, which 
we equate to the risk, or expected loss, to 
the defender (the United States) if the 
supply chain is exploited and a WMD is 
detonated in an inland U.S. city. These 
functions may change if we have invested to 
deter; hence we create both pre-deterrence 
expected utility functions, and post-
deterrence expected utility functions. We 
use these utility functions in our deterrence 
quantification approach. 
5. We simulate a notional “pre-deterrence 
game” that leverages the attacker pre-
deterrence expected utility functions from 
step 4.  We show how the values of these 
utility functions can be used to estimate 
attacker pre-deterrence intent to attack, and 
how that intent influences conditional 
defender risk to produce defender’s pre-
deterrence unconditional WMD transfer 
risk.
6. We simulate a notional deterrence game 
that leverages the attacker post-deterrence 
expected utility functions from step 4. We 
simulate deterrence investments based 
on different optimal allocations of WMD 
detection technology. We calculate these 
optimal allocations using MBRA, for each 
possible network configuration that the 
attacker could exploit from step 3. 
7. We leverage the results of the step 6 
deterrence game simulations to compare 
the attacker expected utility function values 
after hypothetical deterrence investments. 
We do this in order to determine post-
deterrence intent, and we compare it to pre-
deterrence intent to quantify the transfer 
deterrence effects of such investments with 
respect to the different attacker transfer 
pathways. 
8. We show how post-deterrence intent is 
used to calculate the defender’s post-
deterrence unconditional WMD transfer 
risk. Importantly, we average risk across 
multiple attacker options, or an “exploratory 
approach”, rather than focusing on 
traditional game theoretical results which 
identify an optimal or equilibrium solution, 
a “predictive” approach.
9. We determine ROI of these deterrence 
investments.
10. Finally, we summarize this data into 
deterrence “portfolios” to support decision 
making. This methodology is expanded 
and applied in a notional case study to 
yield notional results, all available from the 
authors. 
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EDIT FOREIGN PORT 1
ROI ~ 0.0%/$
V = 25.0%,  E = $4321928.0
p = 12.5%,  A = $0.0





EDIT DOMESTIC PORT 1
ROI ~ 0.0%/$
V = 42.0%,  E = $4321928.0
p = 98.4%,  A = $0.0








V = 100.0%,  E = $0
p = 16.39%,  A = $0.0
C = $1250000.0,  R = $204917.06
EDIT FOREIGN PORT 2
ROI ~ 0.0%/$
V = 25.0%,  E = $4321928.0
p = 12.5%,  A = $0.0





V = 100.0%,  E = $0
p = 16.39%,  A = $0.0
C = $1250000.0,  R = $204917.06
EDIT DOMESTIC PORT 2
ROI ~ 0.0%/$
V = 31.0%,  E = $2160964.0
p = 7.26%,  A = $0.0
C = $0.0,  R = $0.0
OR EDIT
16.39%
Figure 1. Notional WMD transfer network from MBRA
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Summary of Practical 
Implications – From Case 
Study
This proposed methodology may offer 
opportunities for the spectrum of WMD risk 
management stakeholders: those who assess 
the problem, those who propose solutions to 
the problem, and those who make decisions on 
how those solutions will be implemented.
First, there are opportunities for the 
intelligence community. In our case study, 
we analyze the results of a deterrence game 
simulation and conclude that the possible 
network configurations we must analyze can 
be reduced by specificity of intelligence. For 
example, if we have no intelligence on attacker 
preferences for foreign port exploitation but 
intelligence can specify which domestic port 
(from among several in the simulation) an 
attacker is most likely to exploit based on existing 
detection investments and other information, 
then we may not want to optimize detection 
funding amongst domestic ports. Instead, we 
may want to put all available funding at the 
more likely domestic port and then evaluate 
foreign port exploitation susceptibility (e.g. 
whether the  attacker would be more likely to 
exploit multiple foreign ports, or only  one of 
several candidates). However, if intelligence is 
not that specific, but believes attacker will only 
exploit 1 of several candidate domestic ports, 
then we must analyze 2 configurations: OR-OR 
and AND-OR. And, if intelligence believes an 
attacker will exploit multiple domestic ports, 
then we must analyze AND-AND and OR-AND. 
Furthermore, if intelligence cannot specify 
whether an attacker will exploit multiple 
domestic ports or only one from among 
several candidates, then we should analyze 
all four configurations. The advantage of our 
exploratory approach with respect to attacker 
pathway options allows us to compare results 
from several possibilities, as an alternative to 
specific intelligence.
In our case study, if the intelligence 
community did have confidence that an 
attacker would want to exploit both domestic 
ports of entry, we found that the modeling 
results for optimal deterrence investment are 
indifferent to whether the attacker exploits a 
single foreign port, or multiple. With the caveat 
that this finding was the result of only one 
example, such information could help tailor 
intelligence collection efforts appropriately, 
helping the intelligence community prioritize 
RFIs (requests for information.) 
This segues into opportunities for a second 
stakeholder community: international and 
U.S. port security analysts. In our case study, 
results showed that the best attacker expected 
utility resulted from maximum flexibility, e.g. 
the ability to exploit a single foreign port.  This 
finding seems to reinforce the importance of 
efforts which focus on making foreign ports 
more unattractive to exploitation, such as the 
implementation of the International Ship and 
Port Facility Security Code (ISPS).36  These 
efforts may require an attacker to exploit 
multiple foreign ports to have a chance of 
moving WMD parts through, since ISPS 
initiatives help lower individual foreign ports’ 
exploitation susceptibility. Thus, attacker 
expected utility would be lowered, deterring 
exploitation. Since we are taking a network 
approach, overseas assessment efforts may 
benefit from coordination with domestic 
assessment efforts. 
Third, there are opportunities for technology 
engineers who develop/test WMD detection 
equipment, equipment operators, and 
management/budget personnel who fund 
operation. These stakeholders are where the 
rubber meets the road. After the intelligence 
community makes their assessment and the 
security analysts analyze vulnerability and risk, 
these stakeholders develop and implement 
solutions. Results of our case study deterrence 
analysis and subsequent risk reduction 
reflect optimal investments, but costs of 
implementing/operating detection equipment 
that would improve detection capability and 
thus deter WMD transfer may exceed those 
optimal costs. Thus, developers may need to 
find ways to increase equipment operational/
maintenance cost efficiencies or alternatively, 
suboptimal deterrence & risk reduction may be 
preferred if equipment cannot be implemented 
for less cost. This could be an iterative process 
of design, testing, running MBRA simulations, 
and refinement. With a limited budget for 
detection equipment, the MBRA tool can show 
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where to optimally invest for best possible risk 
reduction. But, a workaround to maximize 
risk reduction in the absence of more efficient 
equipment is to increase the available operating 
budget, or from a modeling perspective, to 
relax the constraint on the MBRA optimization 
simulation. 
Fourth, there are opportunities for decision 
makers: those who consider all of the above 
and decide how much to invest in detection 
equipment and where to put it, such as port 
authorities and terminal owners/operators. 
In our case study, we analyzed deterrence 
game simulation results and produced post-
deterrence unconditional transfer risk scores 
as part of the deterrence portfolios. We then 
showed that this transfer risk was less when the 
defender invested optimally hedging for AND-
OR network exploitation, or assuming minimal 
attacker flexibility for foreign port exploitation, 
than when the defender invested hedging 
for OR-OR exploitation. This supported the 
importance of overseas security improvement, 
but from a theoretical perspective  it is worth 
mentioning that this result is different from 
what classical game theoretic or optimization 
approaches would suggest: to invest to defend 
against the attacker’s best option, which would 
be exploiting OR-OR network configurations. 
From the perspective of data informing 
strategy, if we continue to implement overseas 
security measures and “drive” the attacker 
toward needing to exploit multiple ports, the 
mathematically optimal attacker solution based 
on traditional modeling might no longer be the 
outcome for which we plan. The attacker would 
desire maximum flexibility (OR-OR) but that 
could be very difficult to attain it if individual 
overseas ports were highly secure. That goal of 
improved security and less attacker flexibility 
in how they exploit foreign ports would be 
driven by data derived from an alternative to 
traditional attacker-defender modeling: our 
proposed approach. Importantly, improving 
security at domestic ports of entry might 
require decision makers to make tradeoffs on 
costs of implementing detection technology vs. 
desired risk reduction, as the best engineers 
may not be able to design equipment that meets 
desired exploitation susceptibility levels within 
budget constraints.
There are notable findings from the 
quantification of deterrence as well. One 
finding worth mentioning, as also discussed in 
Taquechel and Lewis (2012), is that deterrence 
quantification in and of itself is an interesting 
metric, and when used in isolation, may have 
practical implications for tactical responders. 
But, the overall goal of our methodology is 
to treat changes in intent (quantification of 
deterrence) as means to an end: informing 
unconditional risk values.
Directions for Future Work
Our approach applies concepts from Taquechel 
(2010) and Taquechel and Lewis (2012); 
thus many of the same directions for future 
work explained in that research apply here. 
We discuss these and additional possibilities 
below, in the context of individual steps to our 
proposed approach.
Step 1: 
We have presented a limited notional transfer 
network to illustrate our proposed MBRA 
extension and notional results. The model 
may need to analyze a large transfer network, 
based on decision-maker needs. Fortunately, 
our logic tree model’s iterative algorithm can 
approximate optimal WMD detection capability 
investment for many nodes. The number of 
possible WMD transfer pathways may expand 
nonlinearly as additional layers of supply 
chain nodes which an attacker must exploit are 
added to the model. Such layers could include 
an “offshore layer” of interdiction capabilities, 
augmenting existing shore-based capabilities 
such as container facility detection equipment. 
Step 2:
Initial node exploitation susceptibility and 
existing investment data input must be imported 
into the logic tree model. Thus, the usefulness 
of our proposed model’s recommendations 
depends in part upon the availability and 
reliability of this imported input. Port operators, 
risk analysts, and technology engineers would 
need to collect this data for real supply chain 
networks and WMD detection equipment. 
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Additionally, different node risk data should be 
used to determine results sensitivity; we only 
used one set of node data in our example.
Furthermore, future work could model 
encounter probabilities more explicitly. DNDO 
claims that 99% of all containers are screened 
for WMD.37  While in theory this is desirable, 
it may reflect an unconditional probability of 
encounter that does not take overseas or offshore 
screening efforts into consideration. The 
extent to which resources are being expended 
to maintain this high encounter probability 
and the resulting impacts on container traffic 
flow through ports might be examined. One 
possibility is to more explicitly focus on the 
probability a WMD could be smuggled within 
a container so as to reduce resources and time 
required to screen containers at U.S. ports 
of entry.  This is especially salient as ports 
increase their shipping container throughput. 
For example, the Port of Savannah plans to 
increase TEU (twenty-foot equivalent unit 
standard measure for container capacity) 
throughput from 2.62 million to 6 million by 
2018.38   This presents opportunities for the 
intelligence community and international 
port security assessment community, in terms 
of focusing collection efforts on exploitation 
susceptibilities of various container vessels and 
overseas container terminals. 
Future work may also expand the modeled 
number of container facilities through which an 
attacker could conceivably transfer a container 
with a hidden WMD. The model’s equations 
would be modified. This could be done for both 
domestic U.S. ports of entry and foreign ports. 
Also, future work may expand our model to more 
explicitly show WMD encounter and detect 
probabilities in foreign ports.  The challenge 
may be getting appropriate quantifiable data 
on foreign port exploitation susceptibility. 
Evaluating optimal investment in foreign 
ports to deter and reduce WMD transfer 
risk, or evaluating a combination of optimal 
investments in both foreign and domestic 
U.S. ports of entry, may  provide quantitative 
support for the Maritime Commerce Security 
Plan’s guidance to “interdict the threat as far as 
possible from the U.S. borders.”39 
Step 3: 
We used conditional WMD transfer risk 
equations that reflected conditional risk of both 
U.S. inland targets, instead of specifying the 
attacker would prefer one over the other. This 
was a simplification for expository purposes, 
because the focus of this initial research was 
on optimizing deterrence investment in WMD 
technology at U.S. ports of entry. However, 
future work may create expected utility 
functions (derived from the conditional risk 
equations) for the deterrence game, which only 
reflect the consequences to one of the multiple 
U.S. inland targets. The transfer pathways 
would be expanded to include a specific U.S. 
inland target. This may change the notional 
results.
Step 4: 
We have made certain assumptions about 
availability of port risk information to would-
be attackers, and have made assumptions 
about the utility theories underpinning our 
expected utility functions. Essentially, we have 
assumed perfect attacker information meaning 
all information is available to prospective 
attackers, and have assumed subjective 
expected utility theory meaning attackers make 
decisions linearly. See Taquechel and Lewis 
for more discussion on these theories and how 
utility functions could be modified in future 
WMD deterrence modeling to accommodate 
alternate theories.40
Step 5: 
Depending on changes to conditional risk 
equations (e.g. discriminating between different 
U.S. inland city detonation consequences 
instead of aggregating them for all transfer 
pathways) and/or changes to expected utility 
functions, as proposed above in future research 
for steps 3 and 4, the information in the pre-
deterrence game may change.  With respect to 
perfect vs. imperfect information, an analyst 
could model the pre-deterrence game assuming 
either perfect information, or imperfect 
information, and then could examine how the 
deterrence effectiveness of additional WMD 
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technology investments changed based on pre-
deterrence game information availability.
Steps 6-8: 
Because we did not use a traditional game 
theoretical approach to our deterrence “games” 
in our methodology, we did not leverage 
defender expected utility functions. Future 
work might leverage more traditional game 
theoretical approaches to quantify deterrence. 
Also, we assumed a deterrence game of five 
defender courses of action (COAs) and six 
attacker COAs; future work might examine how 
deterrence can be quantified in a game with 
different numbers of attacker post-deterrence 
and defender deterrence options.
Furthermore, future work may 
simultaneously optimize investments at both 
foreign ports and domestic ports of entry, again 
emphasizing the potential role that those who 
help implement and evaluate ISPS could play, 
in addition to those who evaluate U.S. port 
security.
Beyond WMD and Port 
Exploitation:
Future research might apply this approach to 
problems beyond WMD transfer risk and U.S. 
port exploitation susceptibility analysis. For 
example, the transfer pathway logic could be 
applied to model adversarial decision making 
options in any sort of network, i.e. how an 
attacker might choose from among options to 
move any sort of illicit people/goods through 
a collection of nodes. These junctures could 
be just ports, a combination of ports and 
inland cities as described here, or solely 
inland targets, as a modeler or decision maker 
requires. It is possible an entire network could 
be modeled across the entire United States or 
internationally through land borders, modeling 
adversarial transfer pathway options in a much 
broader network than we have offered here. 
It may be possible that transfer pathway 
logic (AND and OR gates) used here could be 
combined with traditional network science 
metrics (degree, closeness, etc.)41 to create a 
more comprehensive network exploitation 
analysis. The AND-OR gate approach comes 
from fault tree analysis, used in reliability 
engineering. For example, suppose this analysis 
was expanded to include the physical links 
between U.S. ports and inland cities.42 This 
could influence the utility and risk calculations. 
We propose three notional options to examine 
this.
One option is that absent specific intelligence, 
node degree might reflect a greater propensity 
for an attacker to choose AND vs OR, for the 
transfer pathway. An attacker may prefer 
to exploit both U.S. ports (AND) if the port 
“degrees” were sufficiently low (e.g. if there 
were only one railway leading out of each port 
toward the ultimate target), but might prefer 
to exploit only 1 (OR) if that port’s degree were 
sufficiently high (e.g. if there were multiple 
railways leading from that U.S. port to exploit). 
Another option is that the links might have 
value in and of themselves (e.g. what is the 
likelihood various railroad companies could 
be exploited after a WMD has cleared initial 
U.S. port of entry?), which would increase the 
complexity of the model’s algorithm. A third 
option is that the links might be assumed to 
be of no intrinsic value, but their presence 
would increase each U.S. port’s exploitation 
susceptibility proportional to degree. Lewis’ 
MBRA tool offers ways to use both network 
analysis and fault tree analysis in tandem to 
thoroughly scrutinize a network.43 
Also, the modeling of failure susceptibilities 
as a function of investment could have broad 
applicability beyond maritime transfer of WMD; 
it might be applied to other system reliability 
analyses where budget is a concern. Models that 
simulate the allocation of resources to reduce 
some probability of an undesirable event (or 
increase the probability of a desirable event) 
could use our methodology. Furthermore, the 
deterrence quantification techniques used here 
are general enough to be applied to various 
adversarial or game theoretical analyses where 
deterrence quantification is desirable – be they 
analyses of crime, terrorism, WMD terrorism, 
counternarcotics, immigration interdiction, etc. 
The basic deterrence quantification technique 
was influenced by literature on deterring 
intentional acts other than terrorism.44 
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These techniques broaden risk analysis 
discourse by focusing on how phenomena from 
“earlier in the attack chain” may influence the 
actual attack options. By modeling deterrence, 
we show how changes in attacker intent, formed 
during the attacker’s early attack planning 
stages, may influence the attacker’s decision 
making. This approach also offers an alternative 
to traditional defender-attacker-defender 
or game-theoretical modeling in WMD risk 
analysis, by exploring possible outcomes rather 
than focusing on an “optimal” outcome. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
We can only hypothesize how the attacker might 
exploit different pathways to transfer a WMD to 
an inland U.S. city and detonate it. Some models 
make predictions, but we prefer the exploratory 
approach. An attacker’s expected utilities from 
transferring a WMD within a shipping container 
through different supply chain pathways, 
and ultimately detonating in an inland U.S. 
city, can be calculated both before and after 
hypothetical transfer deterrence investments. 
Those expected utilities determine both pre 
and post-deterrence intent values for each 
COA, and those intent values help us quantify 
transfer deterrence effectiveness of the transfer 
deterrence investments.
We then apply those post-deterrence 
intent values to determine average defender 
post-deterrence unconditional risk. Then, 
we compare that average post-deterrence 
unconditional risk to the average pre-deterrence 
unconditional risk and optimal investment at 
each domestic port of entry, to calculate ROI of 
that optimal investment. Finally, we aggregate 
transfer deterrence effectiveness values, 
unconditional defender risk, and ROI of the 
transfer deterrence investments into concise 
portfolios to support decision-making.
The value of this approach is that we can 
calculate our risk, or expected loss from 
exploitation of the maritime supply chain and 
WMD detonation, while accounting for not only 
(1) the exploitation susceptibility reduction 
effects of hypothetical optimal investments 
to increase WMD detection probability, but 
also accounting for (2) the transfer deterrence 
effects those investments may have on a 
would-be attacker’s decision-making. We 
account for these phenomena in context of 
the possible changes in network topology, 
or different attacker transfer pathways and 
network configurations. We also incorporate 
data representing foreign port exploitation 
susceptibility, as the role of foreign ports in 
WMD transfer risk analysis is valuable. We are 
measuring how we change the attractiveness of 
WMD transfer pathway exploitation, supporting 
business cases for existing and emerging WMD 
detection technology, and increasing the rigor 
of WMD transfer risk analysis and mitigation 
by integrating ideas from existing efforts with 
our own concepts into a holistic framework. 
We may benefit from studying the 
effectiveness of emerging WMD detection 
technology in the context of supply chain 
exploitation risk to justify implementation of 
that technology, and from studying the costs 
required to develop, implement, operate and 
maintain that technology. Also, the deterrence 
effectiveness and resulting unconditional 
WMD transfer risk of existing solutions such as 
the Megaports Initiative, CBP radiation portal 
monitors, and other detection initiatives might 
be analyzed. The combined effects of both 
existing and new technology in a port could 
be modeled, as could the effects of replacing 
existing technology with new technology 
altogether. 
We have given examples of deterrence 
effectiveness analysis and resulting risk, with 
other policy implications, in our case study. 
With such deterrence effectiveness and risk 
reduction metrics, the Global Nuclear Detection 
Architecture’s layered defense approach to 
enhancing supply chain security against WMD 
transfer could be enhanced. The RNTRA 
methodology may benefit from concepts 
discussed in our approach. Also, policymakers 
could have rigorous justification for their 
investment decisions as well as additional 
metrics to report. Ultimately, our proposed 
approach could contribute to the improvement 
of the GNDA, and help to increase security of 
the maritime supply chain. 
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